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Abstract  
 
In order to meet humanitarian assistance programs, donor organizations like WFP need to 
procure food either locally or import it. Internal conflict may pose significant barriers to 
local and regional procurement programs like P4P. We develop a methodology to 
estimate the cost of conflict using a microeconomic setting. We examine the use of 
forward contracts to procure locally and derive a) what price should be paid to the 
suppliers, b) how should contracts be designed so that agents relinquish conflict and sign 
P4P contracts. 
 




“Sudan remains one of the World Food Programme’s (WFP) most complex operations, 
and large-scale humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected areas will continue to be 
needed in2011. While some progress has been made in the overall security and stability 
situation since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the 
widespread destruction and population displacement caused by decades of war, further 
exacerbated by recent poor harvests, high food prices and ongoing conflict, leave much 
of Sudan engulfed in a humanitarian crisis” – World Food Program 
 
According to an estimate by FAO/WFP, 890000 people are currently severely food 
insecure and 2.4 million people are moderately food insecure in Sudan (United Nations 
Mission). Southern Sudan faces threats to food security due to a) historical and ongoing 
conflict, b) extremely low level of basic infrastructure, c) internally displaced populations 
and d) extreme environmental conditions (WFP country profile:Sudan).The 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the 21-year north-south civil war in Sudan 
is going to put further pressure on the existing limited resources. Under these 
circumstances, humanitarian organizations like WFP intends to support with programs to 
assist returnees to reintegrate into their communities, build their livelihoods and achieve 
food security.   
WFP support plans include food for education (school feeding and take-home 
rations),  food for work and food for recovery programs, work with communities to carry 
out much-needed infrastructure projects such as feeder roads, dams, schools, health 
clinics, wells and water collection ponds, training programs and support vocational 
training for adults. In order to successfully implement these support programs, WFP 
needs to procure a significant quantity of staple crop. Typically, food may be procured 
either locally or it could be imported from other countries that have surplus. Commodities   4 
for food aid may be procured from different sources. US food aid depends on commodity 
procurement in the US and a powerful political coalition of US farm groups, shippers and 
relief agencies supports in-kind food aid donation (Haggblade and Tschirley, 2007). 
Alternatively, local procurement of food aid in Africa has attracted growing interest due 
to several reasons. Local and regional procurement (henceforth, LRP) is gaining 
importance primarily because it can be less costly and aid can be delivered much faster. 
In fact, WFP’s Financial Rule states that: 
 
“When conditions are equal, preference will be given to purchasing from developing 
countries”(World Food Program, 2010).  
 
In 2009, under LRP initiative, WFP bought almost US$1 billion worth of food 
commodities, 82 percent of which was purchased from developing countries. Total 
purchases in 2010 were 3.2 million metric tons, costing US$1.25 billion (World Food 
Program, 2010). WFP’s experience suggests that LRP may lead to significant savings in 
terms of both commodity costs and delivery times. For instance, on average, maize 
procured in Africa costs 30% to 50% less than white maize imported from the US and 
arrives 1 to 2 months faster than imports from the US (Haggblade and Tschirley, 2007).  
  The procurement rule of WFP is guided by the “Principle of cost efficiency and 
minimum cost”, whereby, food is procured locally if local prices are less than Import 
Parity Price (henceforth, IPP) (Purchase For Progress, 2010). When LRP meets the cost 
efficiency principle, it makes economic sense to procure food locally. On the other hand, 
if it is more costly to procure locally then donor organizations like WFP face a moral   5 
dilemma: should they meet the planned development objectives by importing from 
abroad at an IPP lower than regional price? Or, should they continue procuring locally 
even at a price higher than IPP? If the latter route is followed, it is hard to justify in 
economic terms if one is looking only at price differentials. Although local procurement 
may involve higher costs in the short run, one might argue that the long term benefits of 
doing so could be substantial. This is particularly true for a region like Sudan, where long 
term building of markets is a prerequisite for farmers. Stable demand for crops form an 
entrusted organization like WFP could provide incentives for the agents to come back to 
farming. When they know that there is going to be a secure market outlet for their 
produce, it can potentially provide significant motivation for them to revert back to 
agricultural production.   
 
Purchase For Progress 
Purchase for Progress (henceforth, P4P) is an integral part of WFP’s local and regional 
procurement program. P4P enables WFP to experiment with new mechanisms to 
purchase food locally. Through this program, WFP has realized cost savings of US$22.6 
million with respect to import parity price (IPP) (World Food Program, 2011). The 
objective is to leverage WFP’s demand for food commodities to develop market 
opportunities for smallholder, low-income farmers. The underlying idea behind P4P 
initiative is as follows: a secure market would encourage smallholder farmers to increase 
and improve the quality of production resulting in higher incomes (WFP: Purchase for 
Progress). In order to implement P4P, different approaches are being piloted and tested, 
depending on the local conditions in each country.    6 
  In case of Southern Sudan, the goal of P4P is to strengthen the (re)emergence of 
farmers’ organizations after the prolonged civil war. The idea is that once the farmer 
organization (FO’s) are able to access a stable market, they will motivate agricultural 
production of their members, thereby revitalizing local markets and contributing to the 
region's economic integration and stabilization (Purchase for Progress: Southern Sudan).  
Committed demand from WFP is assumed to encourage production and it is envisioned 
that over time, they should be able to participate in competitive tendering on commercial 
markets (Purchase for Progress: Southern Sudan).  
In 2010, P4P has started working with farmers’ organizations in central and 
western Equatoria (known as the Greenbelt), in the semi-tropical zone of the 
southwestern part of the country. Through P4P, WFP intends to buy sorghum and maize 
from the participating households. Contracts have been signed with 4100 farmers to 
procure 1500 metric tones of food over 2 years (Purchase for Progress: Southern Sudan). 
The primary goal is to provide new and stable market opportunities to the targeted 
population. This project gives an incentive to farmers as well as other stakeholders to 
increase production by offering a market outlet.  
 
Problem with LRP/P4P 
Local and regional procurement of food aid commodities is not a panacea. WFP has, in 
fact, encountered problems in identifying reliable suppliers of food aid commodities; 
limited infrastructure causing delay in delivery, etc (WFP, 2007). Also, as mentioned 
earlier, the basic premise of LRP is that food would be sourced locally when it is cheaper   7 
than sending in-kind food aid from outside countries. The cost efficiency principle may 
not be met in a country like Sudan, where prices are likely to be higher than IPP. 
 There are other significant barriers to viability of LRP. Conflict is one such 
important obstacle. In this paper we examine the problems with implementation of P4P 
program in Sudan. While organizations like WFP are willing to invest in development 
programs like P4P, they are also constrained by uncertainties emanating from country 
specific idiosyncrasies. In particular, at the planning stage, there is too much uncertainty 
regarding the price that must be paid to the farmers to produce the food crop, the cost of 
production in the region, the infrastructural problems and so on. One way to manage this 
uncertainty is to resort to contract mechanisms, whereby certain amount of crop is 
purchased at a guaranteed price. 
Unfortunately, limited productivity and high production and marketing costs 
render local commodities uncompetitive in Southern Sudan compared to imported staples 
(Purchase for Progress: Southern Sudan). Low productivity in Southern Sudan may be 
attributed to supply side impediments like absence of transport infrastructure, or access to 
proper inputs. Most of the smallholders do not have access to markets. Lack of proper 
extension services, quality seeds, agrochemicals and knowledge of best agronomic 
practices also lead to low productivity in this region. Prices in domestic market are also 
high also because historically it ahs remained a conflict prone region.  The prolonged 
civil war has damaged market networks, logistics infrastructure and trade in general (The 
HGB Foundation). Following the referendum in January 2011, while Southern Sudan is 
now moving towards independence, almost two decades of conflict have adversely 
affected the infrastructure and economic foundations of the country. Production of food   8 
has been hampered by fighting and displacement, as well as by unpredictable rainfall in 
recent years (World Food Program Country Profile: Sudan). In fact, the Emergency Food 
Security Assessment Report (2010) reveals that in South Kordofan, the probabilities of 
high food prices shock and conflict are both high (characterized by maximum of 5). Not 
only are these shocks are recurrent, they are expected to occur throughout the year, with a 
high scale of severity (Emergency Food Security Assessment Report, 2010).  
The above discussion on the economic situation of Sudan   highlights the severity 
of the problem of conflict, the interplay between conflict and high food prices and the 
resultant problem faced by organizations like WFP while designing assistance programs. 
With this background, we formulate our research questions as follows. 
 
Problem statement  
It is difficult to estimate the cost of conflict and hence it remains a challenging research 
topic for agricultural economists, public and donor organizations like WFP. 
Microeconomic case studies are likely to be more useful than the oft used 
macroeconomic studies due to the following reasons. Existing works typically tend to 
express the economic consequences of conflict in terms of effect on GDP in a conflict 
affected country. While macroeconomic studies do provide valuable insights on the 
aggregate effect of conflicts in a country, these studies tend to mask the effects on 
particular segments of the society. In particular, a macroeconomic study cannot provide 
an answer to practical questions like: what is the monetary cost of reducing conflict in a 
particular region and what would be the cost of bringing the conflicting agents back to a 
peacetime equilibrium. Our goal is to provide a methodology to estimate the cost of   9 
conflict using a microeconomic setting. This approach would be particularly useful for 
organizations willing to invest in a country and asking the question: “How much extra 
money do we need to pay in order to reduce conflict in this region.” Macroeconomic 
studies, by design, cannot answer this practical question.  
 
Literature Review  
Existing literature tend to express the economic consequences of conflict as a proportion 
of GDP (for example, Collier (1994), Staines (2004), Ra and Singh (2005)).   
There have been some recent studies on the effectiveness of local and regional 
procurement programs (for instance, Clay and Riley (2005), Mwanaumo et al. (2005), 
Haagblade (2006)). While Clay and Riley (2005) describe the cost-effectiveness of LRP, 
they do not address the risks associated with LRP. Some researchers admonish that LRP 
may have adverse impact on prices in local markets. LRP can potentially increase the 
demand for food and drive up food prices for consumers. In fact, there have been 
instances in Uganda and Ethiopia where LRP led to price hikes. The report by 
Mwanaumo et al. (2005) explicitly notes that any food aid operation entails risks. In-kind 
food aid may reduce production and trade incentives in receiving countries. It could also 
induce dependency on outside countries, which could have negative long term 
implications.  
Mwanaumo et al. (2005) mention about risks that (a) LRP may push local prices 
above import parity prices and/or historical prices (b) suppliers may default on tenders, 
and (c) locally or regionally procured food may fail to meet minimum safety standards. 
WFP tries to manage contract default and food safety risks though pre-qualification of   10 
traders and by using contract conditions that penalize traders for default (Mwanaumo et 
al. (2005). 
Chalmers (2006) found that targeted programs of conflict prevention are 
significantly cheaper than cure. Thus it may be easier and more cost-effective to prevent 
conflicts before the outbreak of violence. As he rightly points out, conflict prevention 
involves upfront spending commitments by different organizations. Therefore, it would 
be highly useful to estimate the cost of reducing conflict. Our study provides a method to 
estimate the cost of preventing conflict and hence contributes to this line of research.  
There could be challenges with LRP/P4P at the implementation stage. One such 
problem is to design the commodity prices that must be paid to the smallholders in case 
of forward contracts, where WFP commits to procure a certain amount of commodities at 
planting time. The challenge of forward contracting is to ensure a fair price without 
distorting or disrupting markets. Other implementation challenges involve risk mitigation 
mechanisms to prevent contract defaults and ensure that quality standards are met. Our 
paper seeks to address some of these problems encountered with implementation of P4P 
under forward contracting. In particular we examine a) how much price should be paid to 
the suppliers, b) how should contracts be designed so that defaults by agents are avoided. 




WFP/P4P’s goal is to maximize the net benefit from procurement through LRP/P4P    11 
by minimizing the contribution cost towards the program. P4P is an integral part of 
WFP’s local and regional procurement program (WFP:Purchase for Progress).Under the 
P4P program, WFP is testing several novel ways to buy staple crop locally and promote 
marketing opportunities for low-income smallholder farmers. Food may be purchased 
using any of the following methods. The first alternative is a competitive process, 
whereby supplieres compete to sell WFP a commodity.  
The second approach is direct contracting, under which, at the time of harvest, 
WFP negotiates a contract to buy a commodity directly from farmers’ organization. The 
price is pegged to the prevailing wholesale market price for high quality crops. With 
direct contracting, a competitive tender with a minimum of three bidders is not required. 
By virtue of warehouse receipt systems, smallholder farmers deposit crops that meet pre-
determined quality criteria in a certified warehouse. In return, they are issued a receipt for 
about 60 percent of the market value of the commodities. The receipt can be exchanged 
for cash at a local financial institution. The final balance is paid once the commodities are 
sold. 
The third approach is forward contracting, under which WFP agrees to purchase a 
specified quantity and quality of commodity from the farmers’ organization at some time 
in the future at a minimum guaranteed price. In case of forward contracts, the suppliers 
receive a specified agreed price or according to a specified pricing formula (WFP: 
Purchase for Progress). Forward contracts are also being used to build up local food 
processing capacity. For instance, fortified blended flours, biscuits and vegetable oils are 
being produced using forward contracts. This is achieved by linking smallholder farmers   12 
directly to processing facilities so that they can supply the staple commodities required as 
raw materials. For the purpose of this paper, we explore the forward contracts.  
 
The sequence of actions between the players is as follows: 
1.  WFP offers a contract to a Farmer Organization (FO) to deliver a specified 
quantity and quality of a commodity at some time in the future at a minimum 
guaranteed price.  
2.  Contracts are signed between P4P and the FO. 
3.  After signing the contract, a certain segment of the agents decide not to switch to 
farming. They continue engaging in conflict. The remaining segment of the agents 
switch from conflict to farming to particpate in the P4P program.  
4.  If an agent decides to switch from conflict to farming, s/he incurs a switching cost,   
exerts effort and invest in relationship specific assets to produce the crop for WFP. 
5.  After the yield is realized, the principal buys the crop from the FO at the 
guaranteed contract price.  
 
Suppose the economy comprises of n agents, possibly engaged in some form of conflict. 
The P4P program aims to reduce conflict and ensure food security in the region. This can 
be accomplished in various ways. One way is to bring the conflicting agents into 
mainstream activities like agricultural production. The underlying idea is to create a 
stable and sufficient demand for the crop produced by the agents such that they would 
find it optimal to return to the mainstream activities and relinquish conflict.    13 
In order to provide a demand for the produce, P4P writes contracts to the agents such that 
q units of output will be purchased from them at a guaranteed price of p dollars per unit 
of production. Let the marginal cost of production to be c dollars. Thus the profit of a 
typical agent signing the contract is given by  
 q c p                       (1) 
The Participation Constraint or Individual Rationality Constraint (IRC) for each agent is  
u s                       (2) 
Inequality (2) tells us how much price should be paid to a typical agent so that s/he 
relinquishes conflict and accepts the P4P contract. If the agent accepts and signs the P4P 
contract, the benefit would be the profits earned through selling crops. The cost of 
signing the contract involves two distinct components. Let s represent the cost incurred 
by an agent in order to switch from conflict to farming. The other component of cost, u, 
may be interpreted as the cost of leaving the group of people who are currently engaged 
in conflict. It may be the case that conflicting agents have close bonding effects and 
therefore leaving the “peer group” to join the P4P program would be costly for the agent. 
The peer group may exert a severe penalty on the agent who intends to leave the group 
and join the P4P program. This penalty can significantly deter the agents from signing the 
contract, thereby leading to a failure of the envisaged program. Thus the participation 
constraint implies that P4P program must ensure that the benefit from switching to 
farming activities must exceed the cost of switching plus the utility from alternative 
“employment”, which, in this case is conflict.  
We assume that the switching cost s varies randomly across the agents and is 
uniformly distributed over  max , 0 s . This captures the intrinsic heterogeneity among the   14 
agents in terms of their ability to switch from conflict to the alternative employment, viz. 
farming. Agents with switching cost  *] , 0 [ s s would switch to farming. Equivalently, the 
agents whose switching costs are too high i.e.  ] *, ( max s s s  would not switch. From (2) 
we compute the threshold required for an agent to switch 
u s   *                     (3)   
We derive the probability that an agent will give up conflict and sign the P4P contract as 
follows 
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Equivalently, we can compute the probability that an agent will continue with conflict as  
   
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The expected number of agents who would not switch to farming and continue with 
conflict is  












n switch not will agent ob n           (7) 
 
Definition: Counterfactual Supply 
We define the counterfactual supply of crop under P4P program as the quantity that 
could have been produced locally if there were reduced conflict. The peacetime or 





tual counterfac   
max
*
                (8) 
The principal (in this case, the WFP) wants to procure 
tual counterfac Q through the P4P 
contract mechanism. From each of the participating agents, the principal would collect 
contracted quantity q and pay the contract price p. Let the value of each unit of procured 
crop be v (>p). Typically, WFP purchases quantities of staple crops to distribute through 
food assistance programs. Let us assume that the parameter v represents the value of crop 
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This is the net benefit of crops procured from the agents who sign the contract and 
participate in the P4P program.  
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Comparative static results with respect to the exogenous parameters yield valuable 
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If the value of the procured crop increases then the principal would want to pay a higher 
equilibrium price to the farmers. This could be the case, for example, if the desired form 
of assistance is a school lunch program. It is often argued by the farmers that their cost of 
production is too high, which is expected in a region with a history of conflict.   16 
If the cost of production increases, so will the equilibrium contract price. Otherwise, the 
agents would not find it optimal to switch to farming if they are not paid sufficiently to 
cover for their costs. If the benefit from engaging in conflict is high, then in order to 
induce the agents to give up conflict, the principal would have to pay a higher price to 
reduce conflict. Finally, if the principal is willing to purchase higher quantity of crops, 
then the equilibrium contract price would be set at a lower level. The farmers would be 
able to sell higher crop and the income from selling that crop should be sufficient to meet 
their participation constraint specified in (2). 
In this highly stylized set up, the local procurement cost under P4P scheme, to be borne 
by the principal is 
  q s F n p Q p
tual counterfac      * * *               (12) 
As an alternative to local procurement, the same amount of crop could have been 
imported at the Import Parity Price, or IPP (p
W ).  In that case, the cost of procurement 
through imports would be  
  q s F n p Q p
W tual counterfac W      *                 (13) 
Thus the difference in procurement costs under the two alternatives is   
  q s F n p p
W       *) ( *                 (14) 
If the equilibrium contract price p* exceeds the Import Parity Price P
W then the difference 
would be positive. Evidently, the principal must incur an extra bill of $ 
W p p  *  per unit 
of crop procured from the farmers. Thus the farmers must be paid prices high enough so 
that farming becomes attractive compared to alternative activities like engaging in 
conflict. Δ may consequently be regarded as a “cost of conflict”. It captures the extra   17 
monetary cost that the principal must be willing to pay in order to implement P4P 
program in a conflict region.  
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Consequently, the threshold switching cost is computed as  
2 2
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Equivalently, it can be rearranged as  
    q c v u s q c v        max 2               (18) 
Inequality (17) implies that for the implementation of the P4P program, the production 
cost of the agents must be bounded. In other words, for the P4P program to be successful, 
the cost of production must not be too high. This result leads us to supply side policy 
implications. While WFP provides a sufficient demand for the crop and is willing to pay 
a guaranteed price to the farmers, there should be supply side interventions as well. 
Typically costs of production are too high in regions with a history of conflict. 
Appropriate measures, like subsidies, building infrastructure should be taken in order to 
reduce cost of production.  
Inequality (18) implies that the outside option of the agent must also be bounded. 
If not, the envisaged P4P program might fail to induce large number of agents to switch 
to farming. Thus, if the agents obtain too high benefit from engaging in conflict, it is   18 
likely that the IRC (2) would be violated, consequently they would refrain from joining 
the P4P program.  
 
Discussion  
As we have described the situation in Sudan in the introduction of this paper, at the 
planning stage there can be too much uncertainty while implementing a program like P4P. 
The method outlined in this paper can however be used to estimate the cost of 
implementing the program, especially in conflict prone areas. The principal/ donor 
organization need to obtain the pieces of information on n (targeted population), c ( cost 
of production), p 
W ( Import Parity Price) , p* (optimal contract price) in order to get an 
estimate of cost of conflict.  
 
Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
Assessing the relative effectiveness of the three alternative mechanisms (viz. forward 
contracts, direct contracts and competitive tender) is natural extension of our work. Also, 
we have assumed in our model that the cost of production is same for all the agents. In 
reality, this may or may not be true. Future research may be directed to examine the 
effect of agents with different efficiency levels.  
Also,  a significant problem with P4P program is default of farmers on the 
contracts. Weak legal systems could limit WFP’s ability to enforce contracts and impose 
penalties. Often it has been found that after signing the contract, the farmers are unable to 
meet contractual terms regarding quantity and/or quality. Thus the vendor may deliver 
only a part of the contracted amount to WFP (partial default) or not deliver at all (total   19 
default). Even though agents are paid only according to what is actually delivered, 
contract defaults are a concern for WFP (2011). In the case of default, WFP has to 
replace the defaulted quantity with alternative commodities to avoid pipeline breaks for 
the beneficiaries of food assistance programs. Thus contract defaults can lead to higher 
transaction costs. In fact, out of the 150,000 metric tons of food contracted since 
September 2008, about 14% was defaulted and the 28% was delivered with delay 
(Purchase for Progress Update February 2011). The February 2011 update suggests that 
reasons for defaults tend to be similar across countries. Defaults can be generally are 
attributed either to WFP’s own internal business processes that need to be smallholder 
friendly , or to the P4P vendors’ own weaknesses (weak bulking/aggregation capacity; 
financial weakness; lack of key post-harvest handling infrastructure and storage; weak 
governance structures or trust issues). It was found that the two factors often reinforce 
each other. There could be several reasons behind default. Two of them are price 
fluctuations over the contract lifetime and quality shortfall issues. In fact, a significant 
problem that has been a concern for donor organizations is side-selling. Under this 
circumstance, after signing the contract, some of the agents may decide to sell the 
produce to local traders instead of WFP. This may happen, and has often been the case, 
when local prices exceed the agreed contract price. Some farmers may decide to default 
on the contract and sell their crop to the local organization at a higher price. This moral 
hazard problem can dampen the investment inititative of donor organizations and may be 
a serious impediment to the success of P4P program. The effect of asymmetric 
information due to moral hazard is interesting case and remains a future research area.   
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